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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT-FUNDED
REINSURANCE

JOHN V. JACOBI*

INTRODUCTION
The structure of health insurance is changing due to concerns over
inflation, uninsurance, and medical injuries. This article will briefly discuss
the current health insurance reform framework, focusing on one aspect of
many insurance reform proposals: government-provided reinsurance. Through
reinsurance programs, government can stabilize private insurance markets,
reduce premiums, and spread the cost of catastrophic care at a relatively
modest price for taxpayers. Reinsurance programs are, therefore, important
components of current health finance reform measures and are worthy of
discussion. More significantly, considering the place of governmental
reinsurance in American health finance suggests a way to break through a
barrier that exists in health reform between those who propose
(unrealistically?) “fundamental” reform and those who propose (merely?)
“incremental” reforms.
American health coverage has historically been premised on employmentbased insurance. Employment-based insurance is eroding, however. The
causes are contested, but globalization and changing employment structures
appear to be the major culprits. The extent to which the erosion is irreversible
is also contested, although I will argue here that employer-based coverage will
inevitably continue to shrink absent some major structural changes. I also
argue that the structure of reinsurance programs is a guide to the changes that
could respond to the erosion of the employment-based insurance system. The
insight driving this argument is that both government-focused reinsurance
programs and market-focused consumer-driven health care programs share a
vision of catastrophic care as a social, rather than an individual responsibility.
That is, both programs see the risk of catastrophic health costs as amenable to
broad pooling in a way that more routine health costs need not be.

* Dorothea Dix Professor of Health Law & Policy, Seton Hall Law School. Thanks to the
participants in From Risk to Ruin: Shifting the Cost of Health Care to Consumers at Saint Louis
University School of Law. Thanks also to Tara Swenson (Seton Hall Law School, 2007) for her
excellent research assistance.
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Reinsurance programs are, then, important components of short term health
reform and are also essential templates for redistributions of health finance
responsibility that can usher in a new era of American health finance.
The return of health finance reform to the forefront of the public policy
agenda is, at least in retrospect, inevitable. Congress and the states punted on
the health reform movement of the early 1990s. In the absence of solutions to
festering health finance problems, sharply rising prices and insurance
premiums, shrinking access to coverage, and dismay over increasing evidence
of quality shortfalls have created a crisis atmosphere. Part I of this article will
briefly describe the crises in cost, quality, and coverage that propel reform
discussion. It will then briefly describe responsive reform proposals that have
included calls for a lessening of governmental involvement in health finance
and greater reliance on private contractual, market-governed arrangements and
contrary calls for more governmental involvement in the form of single-payer,
national health coverage. Finally, it describes the emerging form of statutory
reform, which forges a path between the extremes and incrementally changes
the current health regulatory structure.
Part II introduces health reinsurance and describes the importance of
governmental reinsurance of health risk to emerging statutory health insurance
reforms. The utility of governmental health reinsurance is premised on the
dramatically skewed nature of health spending, as the sickest 2% of the
population accounts for almost 40% of health costs, while half the population
uses little or no care in any year.1 Through reinsurance programs, government
can induce private plans to participate in precarious individual and small group
markets by agreeing to accept part of the risk of the sickest, highest cost
members. Government reinsurance programs can, in the short-term, stabilize
private markets, reduce premiums, and improve access to coordinated complex
care, all at a reasonable cost to taxpayers.
Part III explores the longer-term implications of governmental reinsurance
programs. It explores the justifications for broad social responsibility for the
higher costs of the very sick in society, and the (somewhat surprising)
agreement among very different advocates that catastrophic costs are properly
subject to social pooling. It then describes the benefits of a broader application
of government reinsurance programs.
Such programs can work a
reconfiguration of the American public-private health insurance partnership.
They can shift to government truly social costs for conditions often requiring
case management over a multi-year, even lifetime perspective, while
maintaining the familiar relationships among patients, physicians, and primary
insurers. These programs create a different kind of incremental change in
1. See KATHERINE SWARTZ, REINSURING HEALTH: WHY MORE MIDDLE-CLASS PEOPLE
ARE UNINSURED AND WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN DO 61–62 (2006); John V. Jacobi, Consumer
Driven Health Care and the Chronically Ill, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 531, 562–63 (2005).
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health finance. They permit metered shifts in the financial responsibilities for
health care and create political space for consideration of further evolution of
the governmental role in American health finance.
I. REFORM REDUX
Costs are up, coverage is down, and quality is under question. It is time
again for health reform discussions in America. That most agree that it is time
to reform our health finance system does not, of course, suggest that real
reform will come. Repeated cycles of reform efforts in the Twentieth Century
did not net comprehensive reform, notwithstanding good reasons for such
reform and good contemporaneous examples from abroad.2 Another cycle is
in process, and the public policy analysis and political positioning is in full
swing.3 This part will briefly set out the crises motivating the latest cycle of
reform discussions, describe the range of systemic and incremental proposals
that have surfaced, and describe the state-based reforms that these discussions
have generated.
A.

Stormy Health Policy Weather
1.

Access, Cost, and Quality

Our health care system is sick, and it appears to be getting sicker.4
National health expenditures reached almost $1.9 trillion, or 16% of the gross
domestic product (GDP), in 2004.5 Spending is projected to increase to over
$4 trillion, or 20% of the GDP, in 2015.6 While the rate of annual increase in
health expenditures slowed slightly from 2000 to 2005 (from 11.5% to 9.2%),
the rate is well above the rate of background inflation and is projected to
continue at 7% or more through 2015. 7 In constant dollars, national health
expenditures are expected to nearly triple from 1993 to 2015.8

2. See JILL GUADAGNO, ONE NATION UNINSURED: WHY THE U.S. HAS NO NATIONAL
HEALTH INSURANCE (2005); Jonathan Oberlander, The Politics of Health Reform: Why do Bad
Things Happen to Good Plans?, HEALTH AFF., Aug. 27, 2003, at W3-391, http://content.health
affairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.391v1.pdf.
3. See MARC J. ROBERTS ET AL., GETTING HEALTH REFORM RIGHT: A GUIDE TO
IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AND EQUITY 21–37 (2004) (describing the flow and components of
the “health reform cycle”).
4. See Victor R. Fuchs & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Health Care Reform: Why? What? When?,
24 HEALTH AFF. 1399, 1399–1400 (2005) (discussing cost, quality, and access concerns).
5. Christine Borger et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2015: Changes On The
Horizon, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 22, 2006, at w61, w62, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/
25/2/w61.pdf.
6. Id.
7. Id. at w63.
8. Id. at w62.
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The rate of health insurance coverage is deteriorating. Between 2000 and
2004, the number of uninsured persons in the United States increased by 6
million, and the rate of uninsurance among the non-elderly rose from 16.1% to
17.8%.9 The “snapshot” rate of health uninsurance tends to mask the extent of
the problem; in the two-year period from 2002 to 2003, over 81 million
Americans were uninsured for some period, and over 53 million were
uninsured for at least six months.10 The connection between uninsured status
and health status is also increasingly clear. The old saw that lack of coverage
is not a health factor because the uninsured get treatment regardless has lost its
power. People without health coverage are at an increased risk of early death
and experience lower health status than those with insurance.11 This is
particularly true for people with chronic illness, as continuity of care and
routine medical monitoring take on heightened importance for this
population.12
Our faith in the quality of the American health care system is shaken even
for those with health coverage. Reports from the Institute of Medicine in 2000,
2001, and 2006 laid bare a statistical case that adverse outcomes are
disturbingly common in hospitals and other health care settings.13 Medication
errors, for example, were identified as causing thousands of deaths per year14
and add $3.5 billion to the cost of health care.15 The most recent of these
studies further reported that medication errors cause non-fatal injuries to 1.5
million patients per year.16 In addition, variations in treatment from region to
region without any apparent clinical explanation diminish quality outcomes,
calling into question the faith historically placed on physician judgment.17
Further, quality of the care that is provided seems to vary on the basis of the

9. John Holahan & Allison Cook, Changes In Economic Conditions And Health Insurance
Coverage, 2000–2004, HEALTH AFF., Nov. 1, 2005, at W5-498, W5-499–W5-500,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.498v1.pdf.
10. FAMILIES USA, ONE IN THREE: NON-ELDERLY AMERICANS WITHOUT HEALTH
INSURANCE, 2002–2003 1, 3 (2004), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/
82million_uninsured_report6fdc.pdf.
11. INST. OF MED., CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE 86–87 (2002)
(stating that adults without health insurance coverage “have poorer clinical outcomes and poorer
overall health than do adults with private health insurance”) (emphasis in original).
12. Id. at 57–80.
13. INST. OF MED., PREVENTING MEDICAL ERRORS (2006) [hereinafter PREVENTING
MEDICAL ERRORS]; INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2001); INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH
SYSTEM (1999) [hereinafter TO ERR IS HUMAN].
14. TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 13, at 32.
15. Id. at 117.
16. PREVENTING MEDICAL ERRORS, supra note 13, at 112.
17. See M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247, 266–67 (2003)
(citing studies).
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race of the patient, with people of color less likely than white patients to
receive a wide range of therapeutic interventions.18 Confidence that ours is
“the best health care system in the world”19 is fundamentally challenged.
Concerns about cost, quality, and access have reactivated interest in
international comparisons. It is well-understood that we pay more for health
care than any other nation in the world—dramatically so if the difference is
measured in dollars, but still substantially so if the difference is measured by
share of GDP.20 This is true even though the industrialized countries with
which we compare ourselves provide coverage for almost all residents, while
about one-third of Americans under age 65 were uninsured for some period
during 2002 to 2003.21 While we pay more, our health status lags that of more
parsimonious OECD nations on measures such as life expectancy, “healthy life
expectancy,” and infant mortality,22 although many factors other than health
care influence health status.23 Americans, then, pay exorbitantly for health
coverage that leaves a large group of citizens uncovered, and that leaves us
sicker, and dying younger, than people in other relevantly similar countries. It
is no wonder that Americans are again turning to health reform; they
increasingly believe, as Woolhandler and Himmelstein suggest, that we pay for
universal health coverage, but we do not get it.24
2.

The Erosion of Employment-Based Health Insurance

Most Americans obtain health insurance as a fringe benefit of employment,
and we therefore think of our system of health coverage as anchored by private
job-based coverage. Employment-based coverage was recently described as “a
cornerstone of the U.S. health care system, as vital in some ways to the health
18. See INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE 77–79 (2003); David R. Smith, Race, Health, and Health Care, 48
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 13, 29–33 (2003).
19. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It: An
Essay on Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537, 552 (2006) (citing U.S.
Department of State release regarding President George W. Bush’s comments).
20. See Gerald F. Anderson et al., Health Spending In the United States and the Rest of the
Industrialized World, 24 HEALTH AFF. 903, 905 (2005).
21. See Jost, supra note 19, at 540.
22. Id. at 553 (discussing OECD data); Bruce Spitz & John Abramson, When Health Policy
Is the Problem: A Report from the Field, J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 327, 328 (2005) (discussing
OECD data).
23. See Jost, supra note 19, at 552; see also, RICHARD WILKERSON, THE IMPACT OF
INEQUALITY: HOW TO MAKE SICK SOCIETIES HEALTHIER 105–110 (2005) (relating poor health
status in the United States to high levels of socioeconomic inequality); David Mechanic,
Disadvantage, Inequality, And Social Policy, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 48 (explaining
that disparities in access to jobs, education, and income support are, along with disparities in
access to health care, important determinants of health status).
24. Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Paying For National Health Insurance—
And Not Getting It, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 2002, at 88.
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care of Americans as the drugs, devices, and medical services that the
insurance covers.”25 But the employment-based system is eroding. In the
four-year period at the beginning of this decade, the number of non-elderly
Americans with job-based coverage shrank by almost 5 million, as the nonelderly population rose by 10 million.26 The number covered by public
insurance rose during that time, as did the number of uninsured.27 The rate of
employment-based coverage for the non-elderly declined from about 68% to
about 60% in the five years from 2000 to 2005, evidencing a trend or erosion
of employment-based coverage,28 and further driving health reform interest; it
is difficult to justify standing pat with a system that is slowly disappearing.29
Some disaggregation of the erosion phenomenon helps to inform the
reform impulse. One aspect is the translation of the high cost of health care to
the cost of health coverage. The annual cost of employment-based coverage
has risen to over $4,000 for individual coverage and to almost $11,000 for
family coverage.30 The increased cost of coverage is, of course, closely
connected to inflation in the underlying costs of health care; in addition,
however, the for-profit health insurance firms that dominate the employmentbased insurance market have consciously adopted business plans over the last
several years that emphasize increased profit margins even at the cost of
reducing their targets for membership.31 This business plan, which reduces
emphasis on both increasing enrollment and reducing costs in favor of
improving returns on investments, has been criticized by some industry
analysts as impairing the viability of the employment-based insurance
market.32

25. David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States—Origins
and Implications, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 82 (2006).
26. Holahan & Cook, supra note 9, at W5-499–W5-501.
27. Id. at W5-501.
28. See KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH
BENEFITS: 2005 ANNUAL SURVEY 34 (2005), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/7315/
upload/7315.pdf [hereafter KFF/HRET 2005 SURVEY]; see also SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 44;
Holahan & Cook, supra note 9, at W5-501.
29. See Alain C. Enthoven, Employment-Based Health Insurance Is Failing: Now What?,
HEALTH AFF., May 28, 2003, at W3-237, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/
hlthaff.w3.237v1.pdf.
30. Jon Gabel et al., Health Benefits In 2005: Premium Increases Slow Down, Coverage
Continues to Erode, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1273, 1275 (2005) (reporting on 2005 data).
31. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, After Streak of Strong Profits, Health Insurers May See Decline,
WALL ST. J., July 31, 2006, at A1.
32. Id. (quoting analyst Robert Laszewski: “Where is this industry in four, five years if it
can’t control health-care costs? . . . It’s on a long walk off a short pier.”).
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But cost alone does not explain the drop-off in coverage; large firms
continue to offer coverage nearly universally.33 Several factors combine to
explain the erosion. First, new jobs in today’s economy are likely to be lowerpaid service jobs in small firms, not manufacturing jobs, where unionization
and full benefits are the norm.34 Offers of coverage in very small firms
dropped dramatically from 2000 to 2004, from 57% to 47%.35
Second, the rate of inflation in the cost of health insurance, while it has
moderated a bit in recent years, is still substantially above the rate of
background inflation.36 Health economists largely agree that the cost of
employment-based health coverage is merely a component of compensation
and that the effects of cost increases therefore are just translated into
reductions in other forms of compensation. However, premium increases that
repeatedly outstrip inflation rates raise special problems. As the cost of family
health coverage has now outstripped the value of an entire year’s pay at
minimum wage, there is increasingly nowhere for the cost to be shifted for
employers of low- and moderate-wage workers.37 Third, many businesses are
shifting a growing percentage of their workforce from the status of employee
to that of independent contractor—in large part to avoid the cost of fringe
benefits, health insurance in particular.38 Unless the American economy
reverses course and returns to the halcyon days of high-paid lifetime
employment in large firms, the drain on employment-based coverage threatens
to continue. In an age of globalization, such a reversal seems unlikely.
These factors driving the erosion of employment-based insurance are
accelerating the push for health reform. To some, these factors might suggest
that the time for reliance on the workplace as a source of coverage is past, and
fundamental reform is now necessary. Short of that conclusion, others may
conclude from the rate of erosion in job-based coverage that some incremental
reform is needed in the near future.
B.

Renewed Interest in Reform

Renewed concern over cost, quality, and access has reinvigorated public
policy debate. The full breadth of the debate will be only quickly sketched out
here. The landscape of the reform discussion is usually described as defined
33. See KFF/HRET 2005 SURVEY, supra note 28, at 35 (reporting that 98% of firms with
over 200 workers offer health coverage); Gabel et al., supra note 30, at 1277 (same).
34. SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 22–23.
35. Gabel et al., supra note 30, at 1277 (reporting on firms with three to nine employees).
There is good reason to believe that coverage for small firms is also more expensive on a peremployee basis than it is for large firms. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 51–54; see also infra Part
II.C. But see Gabel et al., supra note 30, at 1275.
36. See KFF/HRET 2005 SURVEY, supra note 28, at 17.
37. Gabel et al., supra note 30, at 1275.
38. SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 23–28.
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by two poles with a vast middle ground between. The first pole stakes out the
view that market forces and consumerism, if set free from excessive regulation,
could improve efficiency, lower the rates of health inflation, improve quality,
and enhance consumer satisfaction. Essentially associated with this pole is the
view that genuine reform entails allowing the marketplace and free contracts to
control health transactions. From this perspective, government interference in
markets is inevitably harmful, and government should therefore limit itself to
protecting markets (through, for example, enforcement of anti-trust rules). In
addition, government may provide direct financial support to the poor to
enable them to participate in a free market, but that support should go directly
to the poor, preferably in the form of refundable tax credits, in order to avoid
distortions to the market.39 Health insurance coverage should be stripped of
intermediaries to allow (through health savings accounts or similar
mechanisms) consumers to make their own choices.40 These views are
advanced by, for example, the Heritage Foundation41 and the Cato Institute.42
The second pole regards health care as largely a non-market good and
regards direct government action as necessary and appropriate to achieve
universal health coverage. Advocates of universal governmental coverage
question the value of markets in health financing and delivery to a greater or
lesser extent and instead advance a system in which government (usually the
federal government) is the “single-payer” for health services43 or the purchaser

39. One model for a very comprehensive and highly detailed description of such a tax credit
system for the low-income uninsured is found in Lawrence Zelenak, A Health Insurance Tax
Credit for Uninsured Workers, 38 INQUIRY 106 (2001).
40. See John C. Goodman, Designing Health Insurance for the Information Age, in
CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND
POLICYMAKERS 224 (Regina Herzlinger ed., 2004).
41. The Heritage Foundation’s Health Care Reform web page opens with the following
statement:
The Healthcare system in the United States is in desperate need of significant reform.
Policy makers should take decisive steps to move today’s bureaucracy driven, heavily
regulated third-party payment system to a new patient-centered system of consumer
choice and real free-market reform.
Heritage Foundation, Issues: Health Care: Health Care Reform, available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/healthcarereform/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 28,
2007).
42. See Michael F. Cannon et al., Combining Tax Reform and Health Care Reform With
Large HSAs, TAX & BUDGET BULL. (Cato Inst., Washington, D.C.), May 2005, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbb/tbb-0505-23.pdf.
43. See JULIUS B. RICHMOND & RASHI FEIN, THE HEALTH CARE MESS: HOW WE GOT INTO
IT AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO GET OUT (2005); Physicians’ Working Group for Single-Payer
National Health Insurance, Proposal of the Physicians’ Working Group for Single-Payer National
Health Insurance, 290 JAMA 798 (2003).
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of vouchers for coverage for all.44 Others advocate universal governmental
coverage without specifying a blueprint for such a program, although they
often accompany such advocacy with descriptions of national health programs
in other nations.45 These advocates share a belief in the primacy of providing
access to health care for all, a rejection of markets as suitable mechanisms for
health reform in favor of regulatory solutions, and a belief that universalcoverage systems can, in addition to resolving the access crisis, also provide
the means to address rising costs and uneven quality. These views are
advanced, for example, by the Commonwealth Fund,46 the Children’s Defense
Fund,47 and Physicians for a National Health Program.48
Between these poles is a large group of incrementalists. Incrementalists
approach problems of cost, quality, and access by positing that our current
financing structure is unlikely to see dramatic change in the future and then
proposing changes within the current framework. Some would target
vulnerable populations for coverage by existing public insurance programs.49
Others would empower consumers with information and purchasing power,
with the goal of forcing change over time in response to market pressure.50
Others would focus on insurance law, shoring up crumbling individual and
small group markets by changing the law on mandated benefits, pooling of
small groups, regulating (or deregulating) state rate setting, or adding subsidies
to moderate high prices.
A number of reforms have been adopted in recent years at both the federal
and state levels. The emphasis in federal reform efforts has been on increasing
44. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, Health Care Vouchers—A Proposal for
Universal Coverage, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1255 (2005).
45. See INST. OF MED., INSURING AMERICA’S HEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 153–54 (2004) (advocating statutory universal coverage, and recommending
“principles” to guide the selection of a mechanism for such coverage, but not recommending any
particular mechanism); TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING
OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 277–79 (2003) (after
extensive discussion of other nations’ national health programs, advocating a legal entitlement to
care under a national health coverage model).
46. See Karen Davis, Universal Coverage in the United States: Lesson from Experience of
the Twentieth Century, ISSUE BRIEF (Commonwealth Fund, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 2001,
available at http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/davis_universal.pdf.
47. See Press Release, Statement by Marian Wright Edelman for “Cover the Uninsured
Week” (May 10, 2004) (advocating “health insurance coverage for every American”), available
at http://www.commondreams.org/news2004/0510-05.htm.
48. The website for Physicians for a National Health Program describes the organization as
“a nonprofit organization of 14,000 physicians, medical students and health professionals who
support single-payer national health insurance.” PNHP: Physicians for a National Health
Program, http://www.pnhp.org/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
49. See Richard P. Nathan, Federalism And Health Policy, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1458 (2005).
50. See Greg Scandlen, Consumer-Driven Health Care: Just a Tweak Or A Revolution?, 24
HEALTH AFF. 1554 (2005).
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consumer responsibility and authority for health purchasing decisions. These
“ownership society” reforms center on the facilitation of the creation of
consumer-driven health plans, which combine tax-favored spending accounts
(health savings accounts) and high-deductible health insurance.51 While
consumer-directed health care had been discussed in policy circles for many
years,52 I.R.S. confirmation that contributions to health savings accounts are
entitled to favorable tax treatment provided a spur to its adoption.53 Section
223 of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 codified the I.R.S. ruling,
further enhancing the status of consumer-driven care.54 The consumer-driven
plans springing up as a result of these reforms are intended to incrementally
advance the goals of attacking health care cost-inflation by treating health care
as a consumer good and encouraging consumers to shop for price and quality
as they would in any other context.55 Reducing prices is a key to increasing
access to coverage.56
State reforms have been quite varied in recent years. Some of the
measures are narrowly targeted toward one group of residents. Illinois’ All
Kids program, for example, makes coverage available to all children in the
state without charge (for very low-income children) or on a sliding scale
basis.57 Arkansas, using some state funding and some federal funding, has
created a program offering very basic coverage of services for low-income
employees of small businesses.58 New Jersey has required insurers to make
coverage available under a parent’s plan for their unmarried, otherwise

51. See Jacobi, supra note 1, at 549–55; Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of
Ownership Society Health Care Policy, 80 TUL. L. REV. 777, 791–94 (2006).
52. See JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER: SOLVING
AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE CRISIS (1992); Mark V. Pauly & John C. Goodman, Tax Credits For
Health Insurance and Medical Savings Accounts, 14 HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 125, 126.
53. See Rev. Rul. 2002-41, 2002-2 C.B. 75; I.R.S. Notice 2002-45, 2002-28 I.R.B. 93; see
also Jacobi, supra note 1, at 550; Monahan, supra note 51, at 794.
54. Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 223, 117 Stat. 2066, 2471–72
(2003). See Jacobi, supra note 1, at 550; Monahan, supra note 51, at 795–96.
55. See Jacobi, supra note 1, at 556–57; Monahan, supra note 51, at 901–05.
56. The addition of pharmaceutical benefits to the Medicare program suggests that the
current federal administration is not entirely adverse to “big government” solutions to access
concerns. Even there, however, pharmaceutical benefits were added to Medicare using market
mechanisms foreign to much of traditional Medicare. But the pharmaceutical benefit was added
with a market twist. While Medicare maintains insurance functions “in-house” for most other
services for most beneficiaries, beneficiaries must access pharmaceutical coverage through
private insurers.
57. See State of Illinois, About All Kids, http://www.allkidscovered.com/about.html (last
visited Feb. 24, 2007); State of Illinois, All Kids Income Standards & Cost Sharing Chart,
http://www.allkidscovered.com/income.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
58. See ARHealthNet, What is ARHealthNet?, http://www.arhealthnet.com/ (last visited
Feb. 28, 2007).
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uninsured children up to age 30.59 Maryland enacted a law that requires very
large employers to either devote 8% of its total employee compensation
payment to health care costs, or to pay the difference between its expenditures
on employee health and the 8% floor to the state.60 Although a federal court
found the statute preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA),61 many other states are considering similar legislation.62
Many states have reconfigured or are considering reconfiguring their
Medicaid programs after the Medicaid amendments contained in the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA).63 In particular, states are taking advantage of
the DRA’s grant of flexibility to modify covered benefits and to increase
beneficiary cost sharing. Florida, in a program which was created before the
passage of the DRA but has received federal approval, will limit the coverage
available to Medicaid beneficiaries to a pre-set annual limit; with some
exceptions, neither the state nor the plan will have any responsibility for
coverage once that benefit limit is reached.64 West Virginia’s Medicaid
program will create two tiers of Medicaid coverage for children and their
parents: the “basic” plan limits prescription drug coverage and mental health
and diabetes coverage, while the “enhanced” plan has enriched prescription
drug benefits and mental health and diabetes care benefits.65 The enhanced
benefits are available only to families who sign and comply with a pledge to
engage in “responsible” health behavior.66 Kentucky’s Medicaid reform
combines increased beneficiary cost-sharing and reduced benefits with the
promise of increased disease management.67
Several states have adopted more far-ranging plans, cobbling together
several components to reduce their rates of uninsurance. Massachusetts
59. N.J. STAT. ANN. 17B:27-30.5 (West 2006).
60. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-101.
61. Retail Industry Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481 (D. Md. 2006).
62. See National Conference of State Legislatures, 2006-2007 Fair Share Health Care Fund
Or “Pay or Play” Bills: Can States Mandate Employer Health Insurance Benefits?,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/payorplay2006.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
63. Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006); see Robin Rudowitz & Andy Schneider, The
Nuts and Bolts of Making Medicaid Policy Changes: An Overview and a Look at the Deficit
Reduction Act, POL’Y BRIEF (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.),
Aug. 2006, available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7550.pdf.
64. See Florida Medicaid Waiver: Key Program Changes and Issues, MEDICAID FACTS
(Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2005, available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7443.pdf.
65. West Virginia Medicaid State Plan Amendment: Key Program Changes and Questions,
MEDICAID FACTS (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), July 2006,
available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7529.pdf.
66. See id.
67. See KyHealth Choices Medicaid Reform: Key Program Changes and Questions,
MEDICAID FACTS (Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & Uninsured, Washington, D.C.), July 2006,
available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7530.pdf.
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adopted its reform act in 2006.68 Although the plan remains to be fleshed out
in regulation, it aims to increase access by subsidizing some insurance
coverage, expanding its Medicaid program, and using a “health insurance
connector” to act as a purchasing tool for individuals or employees of small
businesses.69 Most controversially, it will eventually require all individuals to
purchase coverage and will impose a small annual cost on employers that do
not provide coverage to their employees.70
Vermont also adopted its health reform statute in 2006.71 It provides
needs-based subsidies for the purchase of insurance, creates a mechanism for
coordinating insurance purchase for individuals and employees of small
businesses, and relies on expansion of its Medicaid program.72 In addition, it
features extensive use of chronic care management techniques as a method of
increasing quality and reducing costs.73 Maine’s Dirigo Health Reform Act
was enacted in 2003.74 It provides subsidies for insurance for uninsured
individuals and employees of small businesses, along with initiatives to contain
cost and improve quality.75 New York’s Health Reform Act, passed in 1999,
similarly provides some subsidy for insurance for uninsured individuals and
employees of small businesses.76 New York’s plan, called “Healthy NY,”
applies its subsidy differently than the other reforming states’ programs:
instead of providing subsidy directly to reduce the price of insurance purchase,
New York uses its subsidy to fund reinsurance for the highest-risk persons

68. An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, 2006 Mass.
Acts ch. 58, available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw06/sl060058.htm.
69. See Edmund F. Haislmaier, The Significance of Massachusetts Health Reform, Apr. 11,
2006, http://www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/wm1035.cfm.
70. See David B. Kendall, Massachusetts Raises the Bar for Health Care Reform, FRONT &
CENTER (Progressive Pol’y Inst., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 17, 2006, available at
http://www.ppionline.org/ndol/print.cfm?contentid=253823.
71. An Act Relating to Catamount Health, 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves, Act no. 190, available
at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/HealthCare/catamount.htm (Click link for “Act 190”); An Act
Relating to Health Care Affordability for Vermonters, 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves, Act no. 191,
available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/HealthCare/catamount.htm (Click link for “Act 191”).
72. See Details About the 2006 Health Care Affordability Act, http://www.leg.state.vt.us/
HealthCare/Q&A_Details_on_Health_Care_Affordability_Act_H_861.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2007).
73. Id.
74. An Act to Provide Affordable Health Insurance to Small Businesses and Individuals and
to Control Health Care Costs, 2003 Me. Laws 1305–1339.
75. See JILL ROSENTHAL & CYNTHIA PERNICE, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y,
DESIGNING MAINE’S DIRIGOCHOICE BENEFIT PLAN: STRIVING TO IMPROVE HEALTH AS AN
AFFORDABLE PRICE 1 (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.nashp.org/Files/Dirigo_Issue_Brief_
on_Benefit_Design_final_hp.pdf.
76. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 132–33; see also infra Part II.C.2.
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covered by Healthy NY.77 This reinsurance provision is discussed in more
detail below.78
The federal and state reforms that have recently been adopted span the
ideological spectrum and, whatever the reformers’ ideological bent, are
incremental in the sense that they build on rather than overthrow the basic
structure of American health finance. The balance of this article examines one
important potential component of incremental reform: government-sponsored
reinsurance. It examines the significant power of reinsurance as a part of
incremental reform and argues for its adoption by virtue of its potential
immediate payoffs in cost and access, as well as its ability to serve as a bridge
to future, for more comprehensive reform.
C. Reinsurance
At the end of the 1990s, American health care and health finance seemed
increasingly dysfunctional. Health inflation returned with a vengeance. Rates
of coverage were stable in the 1990s only because Medicaid expansions were
able to make up for the erosion of private coverage; in the 2000s, the absolute
number of uninsured persons was again on the rise. For a time, public policy
responses to these problems were quite thin, and governments seemed
paralyzed. More recently, public policy discussion has been robust from all
political perspectives, and although the federal government has limited its
response to largely symbolic support in the form of tax policy, state
governments are beginning to consider a range of corrective steps, some
discrete and targeted, some more expansive.
Much ongoing work evaluates these policy proposals and governmental
initiatives. This article will not do so. Rather, the pages below will consider
one component of reform proposals and initiatives: governmental reinsurance
of privately-financed primary insurance. Part II provides background on
reinsurance in general and governmental reinsurance in particular. It also
explains the rationale for including governmental reinsurance as a component
of a broader reform program and the structure for such inclusion. Part III
considers some of the broader implications of governmental reinsurance as
Americans continue to grapple with the rising costs of care. In particular, it
suggests the potential for governmental reinsurance serving as a focus for a
reform discussion that might provide a means for reconsidering sharp divisions
between pro-government and pro-market reformers and between advocates of
incremental and fundamental reform.
Three insights drive this emphasis on governmental reinsurance: one
epidemiological, one structural, and one political. The epidemiological insight,
discussed in Part II.A., is that health expenditures are dramatically skewed,
77. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 132–33.
78. See infra Part II.C.2.
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with most people using little health care each year, and a small number using
the lion’s share. Cost, quality, and access concerns in the Twenty-First
Century have to internalize this fact; we must break free of average
expenditures to see the real landscape dominated by the high costs of treating
chronic conditions. The structural insight is derived from the consumer-driven
health care movement. As that movement describes, what we currently think
of as health insurance is divisible into two pieces. The first piece covers the
routine cost of primary care and other everyday care. The second covers the
high cost of extraordinary care, whether it is the expensive ongoing care of
chronic illnesses, such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, or the onetime cost of treating serious traumatic injuries. This division is important as
reforms focus on moral hazard as a key to cost-containment; while moral
hazard may be a useful concept for cost-containment in the first piece of health
insurance, it seems to have far less relevance to the second.79 Rather, the nonroutine costs of health care are properly considered a pooled social cost.80 The
political insight is that the structure of governmental reinsurance may have
appeal across a broad swath of the political spectrum. Market advocates may
appreciate that it can leave intact the relationships among physicians, patients,
and primary insurers for most transactions. Public coverage advocates may
appreciate that it permits government to take responsibility for and assure
access and quality of care for the sickest and most vulnerable among us—those
poorest served by an unreformed marketplace.
II. REINSURANCE AS A VITAL COMPONENT TO INCREMENTAL REFORM
A.

Smooth or Skewed: The Population Distribution of Health Spending

We can expect the population distribution of the consumption of some
important goods and services to be more or less smooth. Although some of us
have greater appetites than others, we can expect the consumption of food, on
average, to vary by no more than a factor of two or so, and we can profitably
use average consumption in thinking of food policy. Similarly, while some
people are homeless and others have a second vacation home, most Americans
have only one dwelling place, and we can profitably think in terms of one
home per person when thinking of housing policy. Health expenditures do not
fit that mold.

79. See John Nyman, Is “Moral Hazard” Inefficient? The Policy Implications of a New
Theory, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 194.
80. I do not wish to paper over significant divisions over how this social cost should be
covered, and centrally over the role of private insurance and government. See infra Part III.A.
The structure of insurance coverage for the first piece of cost is also contested, but this dispute is
not central to my argument. See id.
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National health expenditures are extremely skewed. Each year, 90% of
Americans use relatively little health care, accounting for only 30% of total
expenditures.81 The sickest 10% in any year, then, account for about 70% of
health care costs.82 Even more significantly, half of all Americans use little or
no health care each year, as the 50% who use the least health care account only
for 3% of expenditures.83 At the other end of the distribution, the sickest 2%
of the population accounts for about 40% of costs, and the sickest 1% in any
year accounts for more than a quarter of total costs.84 This skewed distribution
endures over time.85
This lopsided distribution has significance in the context of this article in
two ways. First, this distribution is an important factor in shaping any effort to
reduce the rate of health care inflation, either through regulatory supply-side
efforts or through market-based demand-side efforts. The effect of this
distribution on cost containment measures is discussed below in Part III.
Second, this distribution affects the stability of insurance markets and in
particular the markets for individual and small group insurance. The effect of
this distribution on insurance markets is discussed below in Part II.C.
B.

Reinsurance: Smoothing Out the Risks
1.

Private Market Reinsurance

Insurance protects the purchaser (the insured) from the cost of an unlikely
but catastrophic loss, such as a fire destroying his home, a disabling injury
preventing him from earning a living, or the imposition of a tort judgment
beyond his means to satisfy. The protection arises from an insurance contract,
through which the insured pays a premium to an insurer, thereby obliging the
insured to pay a manageable amount (often each year) in return for transferring
the risk of the realization of the cost of the catastrophic cost to the insurer. The
insurer is better able to bear the risk of the loss through diversification; it
aggregates premiums from a large pool of insureds and holds the funds (less a
“loading fee” representing administrative costs and profits)86 in reserve against

81. See Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration Of Health Expenditures,
Revisited, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 9, 12; see also SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 61
(updating Berk & Monheit).
82. Berk & Monheit, supra note 81, at 12; see also SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 61.
83. Berk & Monheit, supra note 81, at 12; see also SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 61–62.
84. Berk & Monheit, supra note 81, at 12; see also SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 61–62.
85. Berk & Monheit, supra note 81, at 12; see also SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 61–62.
86. See J. David Cummins & Mary A. Weiss, The Global Market for Reinsurance:
Consolidation, Capacity, and Efficiency, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL
SERVICES 2000 (Robert E. Litan & Anthony M. Santomero eds., 2000), at 159, 161–62.
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the realization of one or more losses.87 Individuals and businesses purchase
insurance to decrease uncertainty of risk of loss.88 Purchasers are risk-averse
and are willing to pay more than the expected value of their loss to transfer the
risk to an insurer.89 Insurers sell the service of accepting risk in return for a
premium. They set their premiums in reliance on actuarial methods for
assessing risk across a pool of purchasers.90
Actuarial methods provide some assurance to insurers that they will be
able to set premiums at the proper level to bear the cost of realized risks while
remaining solvent.91 Actuarial methods are not perfect, however, and
predictions can be complicated by information asymmetries between insured
and insurers, subjecting insurers to the risk that the accumulation of their
insureds’ losses will subject the insurer to catastrophic losses. Insurers
therefore seek out firms to accept their risk in return for payment.92 Firms that
accept such risk, that is, the firms that insure insurers, are reinsurers.93
“Reinsurance” is the insuring of insurers.94 Reinsurers engage in second-order
pooling by accepting risk from a number of insurers, further spreading the risk
of loss.95 Insurers purchase this second-order coverage for several reasons.
They purchase reinsurance to lessen the risks of fluctuating levels of claims.96
The purchase allows them to reduce their level of reserves, permitting them to
expand their business and use reserved funds for other purposes.97 In addition,
insurers, ironically, are very risk-averse. They purchase reinsurance to lessen
the risks of catastrophic loss.98
Health insurers (usually small insurers or those insuring small groups), like
other insurers, purchase private reinsurance.99 They purchase reinsurance to
87. See GEORGE REJDA, PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 22–23 (4th
ed. 1992).
88. See ROBERT I. MEHR & EMERSON CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 10 (7th ed.
1980).
89. See Cummins & Weiss, supra note 86, at 159, 161–62.
90. See id.
91. See MEHR & CAMMICK, supra note 88, at 561–62.
92. See Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important To Be Left To Actuaries, 19
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 349 (1986) (explaining uncertainties rife in actuarial practice).
93. Cummins & Weiss, supra note 86, at 162.
94. See MEHR & CAMMICK, supra note 88, at 600.
95. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 102–03.
96. See REJDA, supra note 87, at 611.
97. See id.
98. See id.; Cummins & Weiss, supra note 86, at 162.
99. “Reinsurance” is also purchased by self-funded employer plans. SWARTZ, supra note 1,
at 102–03. In such plans, an employer offers health coverage to employees, employing an
administrator expert in claims handling, but retaining the risk of loss itself rather than contracting
with an insurer to do so. See id. at 103. Self-funding is motivated in part to avoid state laws
mandating the benefits that must be provided by insurance products. See id. The excess coverage
purchased by such employers is “reinsurance” in the sense that the coverage runs to the plan, and
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smooth out claims experience, to free up reserves, and to protect against
catastrophic losses.100 Health insurers can purchase reinsurance in several
different forms. The most common are aggregate stop-loss and excess-of-loss
coverage. Under aggregate stop-loss coverage, the reinsurer begins paying
when the losses of an entire group or book of business exceeds a contractual
threshold, protecting the primary insurer from the risk that group-wide costs
will unexpectedly exceed the actuarial expectations underlying the premium
charged.101 Health reinsurance is also purchased on an excess-of-loss basis, by
which the reinsurer begins paying when one member of a group’s costs exceed
a contractual threshold; the reinsurer’s obligations under this method are
determined on a member-by-member basis.102 Commercial reinsurance for
health insurers, then, permits primary insurers—particularly those in the
relatively riskier business of insuring small groups and individuals—to lay off
some of their risk, at a price that roughly reflects the expected experience of
the reinsured business, to add predictability to their loss experience.
2.

Government and Reinsurance: The ‘80s and ‘90s

The previous subpart describes the business case for insurers to reinsure in
order to stabilize their business outlooks. But government has also had a long
interest in the stability and health of insurers of marginal groups. Incremental
reforms in the last three decades have attempted to expand access to health
coverage through Medicaid expansions.103 Reforms have attempted to balance
this public program response with efforts to stabilize the private voluntary
health insurance market. As is discussed above, the problem is not with large
employers, who cover nearly all their employees, but rather with small
employers and self-employed persons who seek coverage in the small group
and individual markets. The small group and individual markets tend to be
more expensive than large group markets,104 in part due to economies of scale,
and in part because insurers expend more time and resources attempting to
screen for high risks.105 While insurers have a high degree of confidence that
not to the member, and attaches only when the plan’s or a member’s experience exceeds a
contractually-set threshold. See id. It is not, however, reinsurance in the literal sense, as the
coverage runs to a self-funded employer plan and not to an insurance plan. See id.
100. See id. at 103; Randall R. Bovbjerg, Reform of Financing for Health Coverage: What
Can Reinsurance Accomplish?, 29 INQUIRY 158, 159–161 (1992).
101. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 104–05; Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 161.
102. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 105; Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 161.
103. See Sara Rosenbaum & David Rousseau, Medicaid at Thirty-Five, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
7, 11 (2001); see also Richard P. Nathan, Federalism and Health Policy, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1458,
1465 (2005) (describing a federal-state dynamic by which Medicaid has expanded to cover
additional populations and services).
104. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 51; Katherine Swartz, Justifying Government as the
Backstop in Health Insurance Markets, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 89, 96 (2001).
105. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 52–54.
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the employees of a large employer form a reasonably representative risk pool,
they are skeptical of smaller groups and individuals, fearing that out-of-theordinary risk can render the small group’s or individual’s premium to be
significantly below the costs of covered care.106 Incremental reform efforts
aimed at shoring up both the individual and small group markets have used
reinsurance in several ways.
Most states have high-risk pools for individuals who, due to medical
underwriting in the state’s individual insurance market, are otherwise
uninsurable,107 or who are insurable only at an extremely high price.108 The
coverage usually comes with significant cost-sharing, a period of exclusion
from coverage for pre-existing conditions, can be accompanied by low annual
or lifetime limits on benefits,109 and can have thinner benefits than normal
individual insurance policies.110 The reinsurance aspect of high-risk pools
arises because the pools cannot be sustained by participants’ premiums, even
though those premiums are substantially higher than average non-group
premiums.111 The shortfall is usually made up through assessments on
insurers, although some states provide limited funding from other sources.112
The pools covers only about 8% of the target high-risk uninsurable
population—approximately 178,000 people in 2003113—due to high premiums
and caps on enrollment due to shortfalls in funding to supplement premium
income.114 A small amount of federal funding has recently been appropriated
to address these shortcomings, thus far with little effect.115
During the 1990s, almost all states reacted to weakness in the individual
and small group insurance markets by adopting insurance reform laws
designed to improve access to private plans, particularly for the sick, who both

106. See id. at 53–54.
107. See Karen Pollitz & Eliza Bangit, Federal Aid to State High-Risk Pools: Promoting
Health Insurance Coverage or Providing Fiscal Relief?, ISSUE BRIEF (Commonwealth Fund.,
New York, N.Y.), Nov. 2005, at 1, available at http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/Pollitz_
highriskpools_875.pdf. States that do not permit medical underwriting in their small group
markets do not have—do not need—high-risk pools.
108. See LORI ACHMAN & DEBORAH CHOLLET, COMMONWEALTH FUND, INSURING THE
UNINSURABLE: AN OVERVIEW OF STATE HIGH-RISK HEALTH INSURANCE POOLS 2 (Aug. 2001),
available at http://www.cmwf.org/usr_doc/achman_uninsurable_472.pdf.
109. See id. at 5–8; Pollitz & Bangit, supra note 107, at 2.
110. See Pollitz & Bangit, supra note 107, at 2.
111. See ACHMAN & CHOLLET, supra note 108, at 9–11; Pollitz & Bangit, supra note 107, at
2.
112. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 91–92; ACHMAN & CHOLLET, supra note 108, at 9–11.
113. See Pollitz & Bangit, supra note 107, at 2. Another study counted only 116,000
enrollees in high-risk pools in 2000. Austin B. Frakt et al., High-Risk Pools for Uninsurable
Individuals: Recent Growth, Future Prospects, 26 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 73, 76 (2004).
114. Frakt et al., supra note 113, at 76–77; Pollitz & Bangit, supra note 107, at 2.
115. Pollitz & Bangit, supra note 107, at 9–10.
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need insurance coverage the most and are the most unattractive customers for
health insurers.116 These reforms attempted to decrease uninsurance by
requiring insurers to issue policies to all regardless of health status and limit
the duration of pre-existing illness provisions.117 In addition, many of these
reforms constrained premium rate setting by compressing the range of prices
that may be charged to members or even by requiring “community rating,” or
the charging of all insureds in the same insurance pool the same premium.118
These regulations impinge on insurers’ self-protective mechanisms, restricting
their ability to use underwriting methods to counter information asymmetries,
and to use premium differentiation on the basis of expected risk as a means of
avoiding disproportionately high-risk members.119 These reforms of state
insurance law were calculated to serve states’ insurance expansion goals.120
To accomplish these goals, states had to keep the insurers in the game.
The way states chose to keep insurers in the game, having limited their
preferred means to select risk, was to build reinsurance into the reform plan.121
The reinsurance plans, both proposed and adopted, varied in structure. In
some, insurers could cede the entire risk for any individual or group upon
payment of a reinsurance premium. Under this model, the primary insurer paid
the reinsurer a premium (set at some multiple of the primary insurer’s
premium), and the reinsurer accepted the full risk for that ceded individual or
group.122 The arrangement permitted a primary insurer to shed high-risk
individuals prospectively.123 Other models examined the aggregate experience
of the insurers in the regulated market, determining which of the insurers did
well and which did poorly, presumably reflecting the health status of their
insureds. Funds from the “winning” insurers then transferred to the “losing”
insurers.124 Under this model, the reinsurance would partially compensate
insurers for accepting a riskier book of business they experienced as a result of
the state’s market reforms. The goal of coverage for the riskiest applicants was
to be served by depriving insurers of the tools to screen them out, and the
reinsurance mechanism assured that participating insurers would share
equitably the cost of the high-risk insureds.125
116. See Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U.
KAN. L. REV. 73, 111–13 (2005); Colleen M. Grogan, Hope in Federalism? What Can the States
Do and What Are They Likely to Do?, 20 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 477, 481 (1985); John V.
Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 311, 369–75 (1997).
117. See Jacobi, supra note 116, at 372–73.
118. See Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 165–66; Jacobi, supra note 116, at 373–74.
119. See Swartz, supra note 104, at 96–97.
120. See infra Part II.C.
121. See Jacobi, supra note 116, at 375.
122. See Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 166–67.
123. Id. at 166.
124. See Jacobi, supra note 116, at 375.
125. Id.
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The reinsurance efforts of the 1980s and 1990s attempted to shore up
individual and small group markets, reflecting the belief that attempts to
increase access by private insurance required attention to the risk selection
methods to which insurers in these markets were naturally drawn. These
efforts attempted to improve access for applicants who were or were perceived
to be high-risk by reducing uncertainty and lessening the risk exposure
resulting from lessening the intensity of risk selection. Because, however,
most of these reinsurance efforts added little or no new public money, but only
moved around the money already in the insurance system, they did not reduce
overall premiums, but rather shifted the burden from the higher risk to the
lower risk members.126 To the extent reformers wanted to do more than
expand use of reinsurance for the risk-planning benefits available in private
reinsurance markets, and instead to increase access to coverage for the
uninsured, the vision needed to be expanded.
C. Reinsurance in New Incremental Reform Planning
After a hiatus, cost, quality, and access concerns have spurred new interest
in health reform. Reform proposals run the gamut, although it is fair to say
that those reforms actually adopted by federal or state governments are
incremental in character and build on existing structures including private
insurance markets. It is the individual and small group components of the
insurance market that are critical to the success of incremental reform, as it is
these sub-markets that must serve the working uninsured if private insurance is
to continue to be the anchor of American health finance. Those advocating
access, cost, and quality-enhancing reform initiatives often tinker with small
group and individual insurers’ underwriting, pricing, and design practices
directed at avoiding high-risk enrollees.127 These practices conflict with the
goals of reform efforts because they run counter to the goal of bringing those
most in need of coverage into the insurance pool.128 Incremental reform often
addresses these practices directly. Reinsurance’s function in this reform
environment is to address the adverse selection concerns that arise by the very
nature of the markets and are exacerbated by restrictions on underwriting,
pricing, and design practices.129
A number of thoughtful analyses have examined the lessons of the past and
the potential for the future of reinsurance in health reform. Theses analyses
agree that reinsurance targeted at the individual and small group markets has a
positive but bounded role to play in incrementally improving the health

126. See Mark Hall, An Evaluation of New York’s Reform Law, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y &
L. 71 (2000).
127. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 78–81; Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 164–66.
128. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 78–81; Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 164–66.
129. See Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 166.
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insurance system,130 and often suggest that reinsurance should be coupled with
other regulatory changes to increase access and moderate the cost of health
coverage.131 Reinsurance programs can assist in incremental reform efforts by
shoring up small group and individual markets, reducing insurers risk selection
efforts to exclude potential high-risk members, and marginally reducing the
cost of some coverage.
1.

Shoring Up Small Group and Individual Markets

Two factors explain the importance of small group and individual
insurance markets in incremental health reform. First, these markets tend
strongly toward increased selectivity, pinching down on an important source of
access to coverage. Beginning in the 1980s, more aggressive underwriting
practices in these markets caused dislocations, as individuals and members of
small groups increasingly found themselves rated out of coverage.132 These
practices were not irrational, as “financial risks associated with adverse
selection are greatest for small groups and for individuals—markets where the
variances of costs are the largest.”133 The rationality of risk selection has only
increased, as the health care costs have risen and as it becomes increasingly
clear that a high percentage of health costs come not from random acute
illnesses, but from expensive chronic illnesses, many of which could be
identified through underwriting practices.
These markets, then, are
increasingly closed to those persons reformers most want covered.
Second, these markets are the only sources of private coverage for most of
the uninsured. As is described above, large employers already cover nearly all
of their employees. Many of the uninsured are employees of small businesses
or dependents of such employees. In addition, a shift in the American
economy in recent decades from large manufacturing enterprises to smaller
service-sector workplaces has increased the focus on small group insurance.134
Improving the ability of small employers to provide coverage for their
employees is therefore a significant strategy of incremental reformers.

130. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 130–31 (arguing that government-sponsored reinsurance is
only one component of a broader reform agenda); Deborah Chollet, The Role of Reinsurance in
State Efforts to Expand Coverage, STATE COVERAGE INITIATIVES: ISSUE BRIEF (Acad. Health,
Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2004, at 5, available at http://www.statecoverage.net/pdf/issuebrief
1004.pdf; David E.M. Sappington et al., The Effects of Reinsurance in Financing Children’s
Health Care, 43 INQUIRY 23, 29 (2006) (explaining that reinsurance may reduce variations in
experience among insurers of SCHIP insurers, but cannot by themselves eliminate effects of
unfavorable selection).
131. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 130–31; Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 166.
132. See Chollet, supra note 130, at 1.
133. Linda J. Blumberg & John Holohan, Government as Reinsurer: Potential Impacts on
Public and Private Spending, 41 INQUIRY 130, 131 (2004).
134. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 19–23.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

390

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:369

Individual insurance has been important for similar reasons, as selfemployed persons, like employees of small businesses, find themselves subject
to increasingly difficult conditions for obtaining coverage.135 Katherine
Swartz argues persuasively in addition that the individual market’s importance
in health reform is increasing due to changes in the American labor market.136
Swartz describes the growing phenomenon by which employers adjust their
relationships with workers to transform them from “employees” to
“independent contractors.”137 Rather than hire (or retain) employees, firms
increasingly contract with contingent or “temporary” workers to do the work
formerly done by employees. The firms benefit by shedding responsibility for
paying some payroll taxes and in addition avoid the need to pay fringe benefits
such as pension, disability insurance, and health insurance they provide to their
employees.138 Many workers experience this shift “in place;” they may be laid
off as employees and then retained as contract workers on an independent
contractor basis to do the same tasks.139 Without access to employment-based
coverage, they must obtain coverage, if at all, through the individual market.
Incremental reform, then, depends to some degree on the vitality of small
group and individual insurance plans being widely available. The dynamics
that have weakened the small group and individual markets flow from the
increased selectivity of insurers using increasingly aggressive risk screening
criteria for coverage. Reinsurance programs attempt to counter the effects of
this trend by reducing the need for insurers to engage in aggressive risk
selection activities, allowing insurers in small group and individual markets to
accept a wider range of risks, and increasing access for those most in need of
coverage. In addition, reinsurance can support the small group and individual
insurance markets by reducing the cost of coverage through encouraging plans
to reduce resources devoted to risk selection, reducing the risk premium
experienced by insurers when the risk market is volatile, and providing direct
subsidy for small group and individual coverage. These two functions are
discussed in the following subpart.
2.

Increasing Access in Small Group and Individual Markets

Insurers prefer good risks over bad for obvious business reasons.
Reinsurance funded by insurers themselves in both voluntary markets and in
markets created through small group and individual market reforms did little to
change this preference. While such reinsurance reduces the risk of insurers
experiencing catastrophic losses, insurers must, in most cases, pay a risk-

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See Blumberg & Holohan, supra note 133, at 131.
See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 23–25.
See id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
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related premium to reinsurers.140 The existence of a market for excess risk
does not itself reduce the incentives to risk-select so long as reinsurance
premiums are risk-sensitive. As Randall Bovbjerg has noted, “Reinsurance
alone does not make carriers eager to accept high risks, for the high premium
they must pay to the reinsurer along with ceding the high risk assures that they
will lose money on each [high-risk] case.”141 While these reinsurance
measures helped the business case for insurers remaining in the small group
and individual markets, they had little effect on the plans’ preference for lowrisk insureds and their natural tendency to exploit any possibility to prefer
good risks within theirs states’ regulatory structures. Recent innovations in
state reinsurance add an important additional component: substantial state
financing of reinsurance. Healthy NY is the most developed and studied
example of a state’s subsidization of reinsurance in the small group and
individual markets.
Healthy NY is a program initiated by New York State in 2001 to shore up
the small group and individual insurance markets to improve access to
coverage for the uninsured.142 It was intended to reform New York’s small
group and individual insurance markets in order to “promote access to quality
health care through increased availability of insurance coverage.”143 It is
designed to supplement and not supplant existing sources of coverage. To
avoid “crowd out” of existing coverage, it permits the enrollment of only those
who would otherwise be uninsured by disqualifying small employers and
individuals who have been covered by insurance within the previous 12
months.144 The program modified individual and small group markets by
140. Private market reinsurers have the same incentive as primary insurers to charge riskrelated premiums. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 105–08. Most of the reinsurance components of
the small group and individual reform proposals in the late 1980s and early 1990s similarly
contemplated insurers’ purchase of reinsurance. See Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 166–68.
141. See Blumberg & Holohan, supra note 133, at 132; Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 169.
This is not to say that reinsurance programs have no effect on insurers’ approach to high-risk
enrollees. As Bovbjerg points out, the structured reinsurance components of the first wave of
small group and individual insurance reforms makes compliance with restrictions on risk
selection “more tolerable and less likely to be evaded.” Id.
142. The legislation requiring reports of the program refer to it as the “healthy New York”
program. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 212 (McKinney 2006). The New York Department of Insurance
and the annual reports produced pursuant to § 212 refer to it as “Healthy NY.” See EP&P
CONSULTING, INC., REPORT ON HEALTHY NY PROGRAM 2005 (Dec. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/website2/hny/reports/hny2005.pdf; N.Y. Dep’t of Ins., Healthy NY:
Reports, http://www.ins.state.ny.us/website2/hny/english/hnyrep.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
I adopt the latter designation here.
143. 1999 N.Y. Laws 1, 2 (codified as note following N.Y. INS. LAW § 4326 (McKinney
2006)).
144. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 4326(c)(1)(A)(i) (McKinney 2006) (providing that sole proprietors
with coverage in the previous twelve months are disqualified); § 4326(c)(1)(B)(ii) (providing that
small employers with coverage in the previous twelve months are disqualified); §
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permitting a reduction in mandated benefits, tightly-controlled networks, and
higher cost-sharing.145 But the “most important” feature of Healthy NY is its
state-financed stop-loss reinsurance provision.146
Healthy NY’s reinsurance is excess-of-loss coverage, by which the
primary insurer and New York share the risk that covered individuals will
experience a high loss. As initially designed, the primary insurer was
responsible the first $30,000 of costs for each insured, with New York picking
up responsibility for 90% of the costs for expenses between $30,000 and
$100,000 for each individual; the primary insurer was responsible for the
remaining 10% and all costs exceeding $100,000.147 In July 2003, the range of
expenses subject to reinsurance changed; New York now pays 90% of all costs
between $5,000 and $75,000 for each covered individual.148 This form of
reinsurance is the subject of discussion in other states as a component of
reforms directed toward increasing access to coverage and reducing
uninsurance.149
Healthy NY appears to have been quite successful at meeting its goals of
expanding access to coverage. It has enrolled over 200,000 people since it
initiated enrollment; its active enrollment of over 106,000 people as of
December 2005 represented a 40% increase over the course of one year.150
The anti-crowd-out measures suggest that this enrollment represents net
increases in coverage, and therefore, a reduction in uninsurance for the
population of New York. This surmise is supported by coverage trends. The
uninsured rate in the United States rose slightly from 1996 to 2004 (from
15.6% to 15.7%) and dropped substantially in New York during the same
4326(c)(3)(A)(i) (providing that an applicant who is an employed individual is disqualified if
covered by insurance over previous twelve months); see also LEWIN GROUP, REPORT ON
HEALTHY NY PROGRAM 2003 3 (Dec. 31, 2003), available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/
website2/hny/reports/hnylewin.pdf.
145. § 4326(d) (listing covered services); § 4326(e) (listing copayments and deductibles); see
KATHERINE SWARTZ, COMMONWEALTH FUND, HEALTHY NEW YORK: MAKING INSURANCE
MORE AFFORDABLE FOR LOW-INCOME WORKERS 9 (Nov. 2001), available at http://www.ins.
state.ny.us/website2/hny/reports/hnystudy.pdf.
146. SWARTZ, supra note 145, at vii. The funding for the reinsurance in Healthy NY comes
from New York’s tobacco settlement proceeds. Id. at 10, n.14. The reinsurance aspects of
Healthy NY are described at N.Y. INS. LAW § 4327.
147. See § 4327(b); see also LEWIN GROUP, supra note 144, at 3–4.
148. See SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 133; LEWIN GROUP, supra note 144, at 3–4.
149. See Stuart H. Altman & Michael Doonan, Can Massachusetts Lead the Way in Health
Reform?, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2093, 2094 (2006) (discussing Massachusetts’ health reforms;
suggesting that “refinements” might include adding reinsurance for high-cost cases); Katherine
Swartz, Comments at Conference: Strategies to Strengthen Private Health Insurance Markets—
An Expert Panel Dialogue on Reinsurance, The Role of Reinsurance in Reducing the Number of
Uninsured (June 14, 2006) (describing early version of Massachusetts’ reform legislation as
including reinsurance component).
150. EP&P CONSULTING, INC., supra note 142, at II-1; SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 133.
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period from 17% to 14.2%,151 and New York was one of only three states to
show a statistically significant reduction in the two-year average rate of
uninsurance between 2003 to 2004 and 2004 to 2005.152 Tellingly, the largest
rate of decrease in uninsurance in New York between 2001 and 2003 was in
households in the income range served by Healthy NY (those below 200% of
the poverty level), while households in this income range experienced
increasing rates of uninsurance during the same period elsewhere.153
3.

Reducing the Cost of Small Group and Individual Coverage

Reducing a purchaser’s cost of coverage is an essential part of any strategy
for increasing rates of insurance coverage in any system in which coverage is
voluntary. State-funded reinsurance can reduce the purchaser’s cost of
coverage in two ways. Most obviously, it is a form of subsidy because the
state contributes a part of the cost of coverage. Second, by reducing insurers’
exposure to the effects of covering high-cost members, it can lessen the
expense of insurers’ risk selection activities and reduce the “risk premium”
attached to underwriting decisions.
It is widely agreed that the principle barrier to coverage expansion goals is
the cost of coverage, particularly for individuals and employees of small firms,
and particularly for those with low- and moderate-incomes. A state-funded
reinsurance program serves as a frank subsidy. Money flowing in from
government to subsidize the cost of coverage directly reduces price, whether
the subsidy comes in the form of a per person voucher discounting the market
premium, a grant directly to insurers to defray part of the cost of doing
business, or a fund providing reinsurance for high-cost members. New York,
for example, allotted between $49 million and $110 million per year to statefunded reinsurance,154 and its actual expenditures for 2004 (the first full year of
experience under the current reinsurance attachment points)155 was
approximately $38 million.156 The state’s expenditure of $38 million on the
Healthy NY program amounted to approximately $500 in subsidy per covered
life during 2004.157 The application of a $500 subsidy directly to the purchase
of insurance would surely have some effect on increasing coverage.

151. Id. at II-18.
152. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005 25–26 (2006), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-231.pdf.
153. EP&P CONSULTING, INC., supra note 142, at II-19.
154. Id. at I-4.
155. LEWIN GROUP, supra note 144, at 3-4.
156. EP&P CONSULTING, INC., supra note 142, at I-4.
157. This estimate results from dividing the amount expended by New York for reinsurance
in the Healthy NY program in 2004 ($38 million) by the number of Healthy NY members as of
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But state-funded reinsurance adds value beyond mere subsidy. The
application of subsidy as reinsurance rather than straight premium reduction
does double duty because, in addition to slicing off a portion of premium cost,
it can reduce the incentive for insurers to engage in administrative riskselection actions. If the cost exposure from high-risk members is reduced,
insurers will have less incentive to compete on the basis of avoiding those
members158 and will therefore reduce their spending on efforts to screen for
high-risk indications.159 As Professor Swartz has described this phenomenon:
A reinsurance program reduces the risk of extremely high-cost people in the
small-group and individual markets to a level comparable for large groups. At
that point, the benefits from using the mechanisms will be less than the costs,
160
and insurers will reduce their use.

The point at which reinsurance would have this salutary effect is uncertain; it
seems reasonable to assume, however, that reinsurance programs’ assurance of
coverage for the extraordinary costs of covering high-risk members will affect
the extent to which insurers will expend resources to avoid those members.
Closely associated with the savings realized from reduced risk-selection
activities is the somewhat more speculative savings that could be realized from
a reduction in the risk premium as a result of the stabilizing effect of
government-funded reinsurance. Insurers charge more for coverage attended
by higher degrees of uncertainty. If an insurer rates two groups as likely to
experience $2,000 per person in costs, but the insurer’s confidence of that
prediction is lower for the smaller group (because a small number of outliers
could more readily affect the average loss), it will charge a higher premium—
adding a “risk premium”—to compensate for the additional exposure, even
though it has confidence in its actuarial analysis pegging the expected cost of
both groups as equal.161 The application of government-funded reinsurance
reduces the magnitude of this uncertainty and could lead to reductions in
premium.
Incremental reform seeks to retain much of the structure of our current
health finance system while improving cost and access through targeted
reforms.
As a component of incremental reform, government-funded
reinsurance can perform three closely-related functions. It can help to stabilize
the individual and small group markets for health insurance—an important
goal, as most uninsured persons can find coverage in the private market, if at
all, only with insurers offering individual or small group policies. It can

December 2004 (76,297). See EP&P CONSULTING, INC., supra note 142, at I-4, II-2. 76,297/$38
million = $498 per member.
158. See ACHMAN & CHOLLET, supra note 108, at 1; Sappington et al., supra note 130, at 28.
159. See Blumberg & Holohan, supra note 133, at 132.
160. SWARTZ, supra note 1, at 121.
161. Id. at 54–55.
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reduce uninsurance by reducing the incentive of insurers to reject high-risk
applicants—those persons who most need coverage. And it can reduce the cost
of coverage both through subsidy and through reducing insurers’ incentives to
expend resources in risk-selection activities. The interest in government
reinsurance as a component of incremental reforms is therefore sensible, as it
can apply needed subsidy that can cost-effectively shore up teetering
individual and small group markets, expand access to coverage, and reduce the
cost of coverage. The next Part addresses the longer-term benefits of
reinsurance programs.
III. GOVERNMENT REINSURANCE AS A BRIDGE TO SYSTEMIC REFORM
Health reforms that dramatically change our health finance system are
unlikely in the near future, not because there is dispute that such reform is
needed, but because there is no political or policy consensus on the shape of
broad reforms.162 As a result, near-term reform efforts will be limited to
incremental reform, such as those described above in Part II. In the process of
shaping those incremental reforms, however, there is room for compromise
across ideological divides to achieve progress toward universal coverage and
other goals.163 But which incremental steps to increase access will gain
traction?
Compromise here can be tricky.164 It is tricky because all incremental
reform is motivated by a larger vision of the ideal health finance system. To
put it another way, all incremental reforms are motivated by and directed
toward a long-term strategy of reaching a more radically reformed system
structured according to particular political and ideological beliefs. Incremental
choices may well shape broader future changes, as Alan Weil has noted:
Increments can achieve short-term objectives, but depending upon how they
are structured, they may make the longer-term goal of universal coverage
easier or harder to attain. Even though comprehensive reform seems
unrealistic today, we must continue to discuss and define what the health care

162. See, e.g., David M. Frankford, Unchanging New Leadership, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y
& L. 509, 515 (2003) (arguing that only the federal government can lead true health finance
reform, and as to the prospects for such leadership, stating: “I would not hold your breath”);
Fuchs & Emmanuel, supra note 4, at 1411 (stating that “the short-run prospects for
[comprehensive reform] seem dim”). Timothy Jost is only slightly more optimistic. See Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can’t We Do What They Do?: National Health Reform Abroad, 32 J. L. MED.
& ETHICS 433, 439 (2004) (“One can, just barely, imagine a scenario in which a universal health
care system might become politically viable in the U.S.”).
163. See Mark V. Pauly, Conflict and Compromise Over Tradeoffs in Universal Health
Insurance Plans, 32 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 465 (2004) (suggesting means to bring together
“liberals” and “marketists”).
164. Or as Professor Pauly notes, “[I]t may be that things will have to get worse before they
get better.” See id. at 473.
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system of the future should look like. Then we can judge incremental reform
proposals not only on the basis of who they cover today, but whether they
165
move us in the right direction for the future.

Incremental reforms likely to gain traction are those not inconsistent with the
core programs of either market advocates or regulatory advocates.
Reinsurance is a component of incremental reform that is a plausible
ground for compromise between market-oriented advocates and those
committed to a regulatory program. As the discussion below describes,
reinsurance advances goals of access, quality, and cost-containment.
Significantly, however, it does so without forcing a choice between the broad
philosophical views of either camp. I do not argue that reinsurance programs
are in themselves the basis for long-term reform or even that they will be
central components of a future, better system. Rather, I argue that they are
positive in themselves and are a module of reform that can fit into or be
adapted to many different versions of long-term systemic change, allowing
significant incremental improvements in the health finance system while the
larger debate continues.
There are three important characteristics of
governmental reinsurance programs that permit them to fit, Zelig-like, into
various systems. First, reinsurance programs pool risk at an optimal level,
where personal security can be assured for care not reasonably amenable to
individual consumer direction. Second, they are flexible in both funding and
program design. They can be geared up gradually, employed to shore up
different sub-markets of insurance, and modified to enhance management of
high-cost, long-term care. Third, they can address cost, quality, and access for
that population segment driving the crisis: high-risk, high-cost persons with
complex chronic conditions. Without attention to this group, any program of
health reform will fail.
A.

Pooling at an Optimal Level of Care

This argument for government funding of catastrophic care comes in two
steps, one easy and one harder. The first step concerns the recognition that
advocates across the spectrum of insurance reform accept that the pooling of
resources for the provision of catastrophic care is appropriate. Advocates of
consumer-driven care argue that cost and quality improvements will be
generated by empowering consumers.166 Giving (or returning to) consumers
responsibility and authority for health care decisions will unleash market
power, incentivizing them to compare cost and quality before purchasing and
allowing the sum of these purchasing decisions to encourage cost and quality
based competition.167 The mechanism for this transfer of responsibility and
165. Alan Weil, Increments Toward What?, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 68, 81.
166. See GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 52, at 29–30.
167. See id. See generally Pauly & Goodman, supra note 52.
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authority, of course, is individual spending accounts, or health savings
accounts, owned and controlled by consumers from which they will draw
funds for their health care purchases.168 From this perspective, advancing cost
and quality goals calls for less mediation of all sorts between consumers and
the market.169
Some question whether giving individual consumers market power is
likely to achieve the ends described by advocates of consumer-driven care.170
But the extent of the disagreement should not be overstated. Advocates of
using spending accounts to unleash market discipline recommend the use of
the accounts for routine, relatively low-cost services, not for catastrophic care.
For coverage of catastrophic care, financing in the form of traditional
insurance is called for.171 With respect to catastrophic costs, then, advocates of
markets and government agree: broad pooling of costs is appropriate. This
agreement is significant in light of the concentration of health costs in the care
of chronically ill persons.172
The second step in this portion of the argument is harder: should the
pooling of funds for the payment of catastrophic costs take place in the private
insurance market or through governmental funding? For market advocates, the
need to pool resources entails the need for private insurance to be responsive to
consumer demands and spread the risk of catastrophic costs over the
purchasers of coverage. For advocates of government intervention, the need to
pool resources is closely connected with the argument that coverage of the
costs of at least some forms of health care is a public good and is therefore
appropriately insured by government.173 The ground for agreement is the need
for pooled and not individually controlled funding for the coverage of
catastrophic risks.
It may be that agreement would founder on the provision of reinsurance by
government and not a private firm. Well-understood failures of the insurance
market may, however, overcome this objection. First, reinsurance attaches
168. See Cannon et al., supra note 42; Pauly & Goodman, supra note 52, at 126.
169. See Goodman, supra note 40, at 237; Heritage Foundation, Issues: Health Care: Health
Care Reform, http://www.heritage.org/research/healthcare/healthcarereform/index.cfm.
170. Some observers question whether consumers are likely to have the information, or the
ability to use information, necessary to make sound purchasing decisions under current
conditions. See Jon B. Christianson et al., Consumer Experiences in a Consumer-Driven Health
Plan, 39 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1123, 1125 (2004). Others question more fundamentally whether
cost and quality concerns can ever be solved by increasing consumer-directed competition in
health care. See Thomas Rice, Can Markets Give Us the Health System We Want?, in HEALTHY
MARKETS?: THE NEW COMPETITION IN MEDICAL CARE 27, 30–38 (Mark A. Peterson ed., 1998).
171. See GOODMAN & MUSGRAVE, supra note 52, at 44; Pauly & Goodman, supra note 52, at
129.
172. See supra Part II.C.
173. See Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance As Moral Opportunity, 6
CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 43–45 (1999).
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only when a person’s medical costs have crossed a high threshold, and
therefore, addresses only the level of risk agreed to be suitable for social
pooling.174 Second, it applies a government subsidy to an area in which private
insurance fails to serve at least some of its social tasks. Private reinsurance
does not reduce anti-selection activities of health insurers in small group and
individual markets, as primary insurers are required to pay risk-related
premiums to reinsurers.175 Public reinsurance both spreads risk and subsidizes,
as the payment for truly catastrophic costs comes not from the insurance pool,
but from government. Market advocates commonly accept some governmental
financing role for those unable to pay for coverage.176 Here, government
would finance the catastrophic care for people unable to pay for such care.
Governmental pooling would, in addition, resolve some of the failures in the
private reinsurance market for small group coverage.
Governmental
assumption of this financial risk would hold stable the sub-catastrophic
components of the health insurance system, permitting breathing room for
further debate and experimentation from a variety of principled perspectives.
B.

Short-Term and Long-Term Flexibility

Advocates of a governmental resolution of the health finance crisis of
course support governmental funding of coverage, either through a
governmental single-payer system177 or through governmental purchase of
private coverage.178 As was suggested in the previous subpart, market
advocates do not categorically oppose government subsidies. Instead, they
recognize that some government subsidies are necessary to provide coverage
for those unable to meet market prices for insurance,179 so long as the form of
the subsidies does not interfere with consumers’ incentives to exercise careful
judgment as to cost and quality in health care.180
The common ground supporting government-funded reinsurance as a
component of incremental reform could arise from the fact that it does not
interfere with consumers’ relationships either with health care providers or
primary insurers. Government-funded reinsurance can add subsidy to any sort
of primary insurance, from first-dollar traditional insurance to consumer-driven
plans with spending accounts. In addition, the amount of subsidy can be
adjusted from year to year. This flexibility is important because it will allow a
174. See supra Part II.B.1.
175. See Bovbjerg, supra note 100, at 169; see supra Part II.B.2.
176. See, e.g., Pauly & Goodman, supra note 52 (describing a system of tax credits to fund
insurance for low-income persons); Zelenak, supra note 39 (describing the same system).
177. See RICHMOND & FEIN, supra note 43, at 243.
178. See Fuchs & Emanuel, supra note 4, at 1402.
179. See Pauly & Goodman, supra note 52 (describing a system of tax credits to fund
insurance for low-income persons); Zelenak, supra note 39 (describing the same system).
180. See Pauly & Goodman, supra note 52, at 126–28.
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reinsurance program’s funding to be increased or decreased in response to
accumulated experience regarding the level of reinsurance necessary to serve
access goals. In addition, this flexibility has political appeal, as the programs
can be reduced or increased in response to budgetary conditions without
seriously disrupting underlying insurance relationships.
The flexibility of this component of health reform has long-term benefits.
Because reinsurance programs can grow and adapt alongside a wide range of
system modifications, investment of intellectual and financial capital in the
development of reinsurance systems is likely to pay dividends. If the past is
any guide, the American health finance system two decades hence will look
structurally similar to the American health care system two decades or even
four decades ago: a mixture of private and public insurance and a mixture of
public and private institutions of care. Although we are witnessing the steady
erosion of employment-based health coverage,181 it is too soon to sound the
death knell for that form of coverage. There is, however, a need for some
substantial reimagining of the relationship between the public and private
health financing sectors.
Publicly funded resinsurance embodies one
mechanism for the interaction of public and private spheres of influence and
responsibility and may form the basis for enduring structures of public-private
partnership.
C. Emphasis on High-Risk Persons
As described above, yearly health expenditures are extremely skewed. The
sickest 2% of any insurance pool accounts for 40% of the cost, and the sickest
10% accounts for 70% of the costs.182 In addition, the most expensive people
in any insurance pool tend to be people with chronic conditions.183 The
number of people with chronic conditions, and the percentage of health care
costs devoted to the care of people with chronic conditions, is increasing over
time.184 This increase is in large part a function of the technical improvement
of health care. As physicians are better able to cure infectious diseases, repair
us when we are subject to trauma, and treat us with new drugs and devices that
extend our lives, we are more likely to develop chronic illnesses that require
ongoing, sometimes expensive treatment.185 Relatively current calculations
suggest that people with chronic illnesses “account for nearly 76% of hospital

181. See supra Part I.A.2.
182. See supra Part II.A.
183. See Catherine Hoffman et al., Persons With Chronic Conditions: Their Prevalence and
Costs, 276 JAMA 1473, 1477 (1996); Jacobi, supra note 1, at 563–64.
184. See ROBERT L. KANE ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF CHRONIC ILLNESS 28
(2005).
185. Id. at 28–31.
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admissions, 80% of total hospital days, 55% of emergency room visits, 88% of
prescriptions, 96% of home health care visits, and 72% of physician visits.”186
Improving the quality of treatment and containing the cost of medical
services for people with chronic illness requires the adoption of mechanisms
for the coordination and management of their care.187 Meeting these goals also
requires the identification and nurturing of interdisciplinary teams that
specialize in the treatment of particular chronic illnesses.188 The concentration
of effort and the focusing of funding on recognized centers of excellent care is
a central component of the consumer-driven care movement.189 It has received
increasing attention in discussions of government-focused expansions of
insurance.190 Vermont’s 2006 broad-ranging health insurance reform measure
is to some extent organized around the treatment of chronic illness. It seeks to
adopt a “chronic care model” that will be available to people with the new
government-subsidized coverage as well as people in private health plans.191
Both advocates of consumer-driven care and those advancing expansions of
governmental insurance argue that increased attention on the management of
chronic care can increase quality and reduce the overall cost of care.192
The primary purposes of government reinsurance programs are financial;
they are intended to reallocate risk for catastrophic costs in order to stabilize
insurance markets, reduce the cost of coverage in small group and individual
markets, and increase access for those low- and moderate-income workers
most at risk of losing coverage. These purposes are achieved by separating the
financing of routine care from the financing of catastrophic care, which is often
care for those with complex chronic illness.
This financial segmentation may serve a programmatic goal as well. The
financial focus on complex chronic care can enhance the understanding of the
drivers of the health insurance crisis and can further interest in solutions based
on the adoption of emerging methods of improving care and controlling cost
for people with chronic illness.193 The congruence of the financing system and
the care system will help to facilitate the transformation of the health care
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 36 (citing to 1996 and 2002 studies).
See id. at 76–89.
KANE ET AL., supra note 184, at 106–07.
See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND
POLICYMAKERS 105–11 (Regina E. Herzlinger ed., 2004) [hereinafter CONSUMER-DRIVEN
HEALTH CARE].
190. See Details About the 2006 Health Care Affordability Act, http://www.leg.state.vt.us/
HealthCare/Q&A_Details_on_Health_Care_Affordability_Act_H_861.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2007).
191. Id.
192. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, supra note 189, at 105–11; Details About the
2006 Health Care Affordability Act, http://www.leg.state.vt.us/HealthCare/Q&A_Details_on_
Health_Care_Affordability_Act_H_861.htm
193. See generally KANE ET AL., supra note 184.
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system from one based on episodic, discontinuous care for the highest cost
patients to one in which care is coordinated and provided in settings able to
combine efficiency with state-of-the-art excellence.
CONCLUSION
The crisis in American health care has spurred renewed creativity in
reform discussions. Unfortunately, substantial principled differences impede
any movement toward comprehensive reform, and the best that can be
expected in the near-term is incremental reform that does more good than
harm. Recent work by a number of scholars has increased interest in
reinsurance as an important component of incremental health reform.
Reinsurance can shore up, at least temporarily, individual and small group
insurance markets by reducing the cost of coverage and facilitating the entry of
the currently uninsured into these forms of coverage. Reinsurance, in addition,
can perform these services while fitting comfortably with a wide range of other
incremental reform efforts motivated by diverse views of the proper shape of
long-term reform.
In addition, the use of government-funded reinsurance provides political
breathing room, allowing some motion toward increased access and improved
quality without running afoul of central tenets of divergent political positions
on long-term insurance reform. It serves the goals of cost control and quality
improvement without interfering with existing health care or primary insurance
relationships; it is flexible programmatically and financially, and it focuses
attention on the chronically ill–the population whose care must be a focus of
any meaningful long-term reform. Government-funded reinsurance, then,
serves as a valuable component to current incremental reform efforts, and also
acts as a bridge between our current fractured discussion of health reform to a
future comprehensive, but as-yet undetermined, comprehensive reform.
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